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SUMMARYAs a severe recession unfolds in the aftermath of the financial
crisis, Europe must avoid entering a vicious circle. To that end, a budgetary
boost is needed on top of the rescue package for the financial sector and
further lowering of interest rates by central banks. This budgetary boost
should be closely coordinated at EU level to ensure consistency and avoid
free-riding behaviour. However, structural deficit levels in some EU member
states are already high. There is a risk, therefore, that a budgetary stimulus
could undermine budgetary sustainability. To address this concern, the
stimulus needs to go hand in hand with a strengthened budgetary frame-
work, complementing and reinforcing the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP).
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Budgetary boost:Harmonised VAT cut of
one percentage point across the board
plus national measures, especially
targeted relief, tailored to country-
specific circumstances in order to reach
a total of one percent of GDP, to become
effective by 1 January 2009 and to be
phased out in 2010. Reform commit-
ment: Compensation for deficits above
three percent of GDP through sustain-
ability-enhancing reforms. Enforcement:
Correction of excessive deficits to be
implemented as early as 2010 if reform
commitment is broken. Prudent borrow-
ing:Agreement by all euro-area
countries not to borrow at more than
200 basis points above the lowest euro-
area government bond yield.
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Figure 2: Major world economies heading for recession
(Evolution of IMF World Outlook forecast of GDP growth for 2009)
Source: IMF. CEE: central and eastern European countries.
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Figure 1: Ifo economic climate index for the euro area 1993-2008
Source: Ifo Institute.
1On 11 November 2008
the World Bank revised
its growth forecast for
2009 downward to one
percent – more than
one percentage point
lower still than the
November forecast of
the IMF released on 6
November 2008.
still do more soon. But it would be
risky to rely on monetary policy
alone given the clogging of key mon-
etary transmission mechanisms. 
To be effective, action needs to be
bold, timely and significant. As far
as Europe is concerned, it should
also be coordinated in order to
ensure consistency and avoid
free-riding behaviour. The decision
on whether to act now through a
budgetary stimulus should be
viewed as a watershed, as was the
downward adjustment in turn fur-
ther weighs on the balance sheets
of financial institutions, leading to
additional losses, added strains in
the interbank market, and supple-
mentary credit constraints. 
This exceptional Keynesian situa-
tion requires an exceptional
Keynesian budgetary stimulus in
addition to the financial rescue
package. The increasingly accom-
modating stance of central banks
has been helpful, and the ECB should
THERE IS A BROADENING
CONSENSUS that, beyond
emergency support to the
financial system, the current
global financial crisis is a once-in-
a-generation event calling for
exceptional policy responses in
order to preserve jobs, livelihoods,
financial stability and ultimately
political support for open markets. 
Since the crisis suddenly took a
turn for the worse in September,
governments and central banks
have acted quickly and forcefully
through emergency measures to
avoid a collapse of the financial
sector. But in spite of such action
the financial sector is experienc-
ing a severe contraction and the
economic outlook for the non-
financial sector is deteriorating
extraordinarily sharply (Figure 1).
Forecasts for 2009 and beyond
are constantly being revised
downwards (Figure 2). Although
crucial, bank recapitalisation,
credit guarantees and the easing
of monetary policy are clearly not
proving sufficient. The sudden
drop in financial wealth, across-
the-board deleveraging, credit
rationing and the rise in the prices
of capital and debt, as well as the
drop in demand worldwide, are
coming together to make a severe
recession on both sides of the
Atlantic a likely prospect. The first
global recession since the second
world war has even become a pos-
sible scenario
1. The drop in com-
modity prices, which is a welcome
trend for the industrial countries,
is itself a consequence of this
recession and, as such, is too
weak to reverse the bleak outlook.
Markets in the major economies
are pricing in a recession and theirA EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME
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Figure 3: Select euro-area government bond spreads
Spread over German benchmark bond (1 Sept 2007-13 Nov 2008)
Source: Thomson Datastream.
2 See
http://ec.europa.eu/eco
nomy_finance/sg_pact_fi
scal_policy/ for the
Stability Programmes
and their assessments
by the European
Commission.
decision on whether to act to save
Lehman Brothers or to let it go
down. An overcautious wait-and-
see strategy would risk producing
a drawn-out recession with dire
economic and political conse-
quences.  National governments
might be tempted to engage in
subsidy wars to support sectors in
distress and promote national
champions. Just as in the Lehman
case, there is a real possibility that
inaction may ultimately turn out to
be more expensive than action and
inflict damage on the internal mar-
ket and our market-based system. 
Though crucial, coordinated EU
action is difficult for two reasons.
First, it is always a major task to
coordinate action among a large
number of countries. Second, this
task is even more complicated
because some countries are in
relatively good budgetary shape,
whereas others, which already
recorded significant structural
deficits before the downturn, now
find themselves in trouble.
Furthermore, some of these
countries have repeatedly com-
mitted to medium-term objectives,
but have not delivered on their
commitments
2. There is thus legiti-
mate concern that a budgetary
stimulus could undermine
European public finances at a time
markets are wary of risk. Hence a
coordinated European budgetary
stimulus must be accompanied by
a strengthened budgetary frame-
work to ensure that earlier mis-
takes are not repeated.
Clearly markets share the concern
about budgetary sustainability, as
indicated by the fact that spreads
have widened markedly across
euro-area government bond mar-
kets in recent weeks (Figure 3).
While this partly reflects uneven
liquidity, concerns about the
sustainability of public finances
have also intensified.  
Against this backdrop, the tempta-
tion is to eschew joint EU action
and simply let individual member
states use whatever room for
manoeuvre they have. But such an
approach is unlikely to produce
results. Experience has shown
that, in open economies,
budgetary policy has only limited
effect. The more open the econo-
my is, the more governments
would be tempted to free-ride and
rely on their neighbours’ stimulus.
Hence a loosely coordinated
response is unlikely to deliver.         
What we propose instead is to
combine a substantial coordinated
stimulus with measures that
improve the long-term
sustainability of public finances.
Instead of recommending restraint
to the member states whose
budgetary situation is weaker, we
recommend that all countries
should participate equally in the
stimulus and that those whose sit-
uation is weaker should go further
in the implementation of
sustainability-enhancing reforms.  
This proposal raises the issue of
enforcement. Although it has
helped foster a gradual improve-
ment in the budgetary situation of
the euro-area countries, the SGP
still suffers from a credibility gap.
Especially, it  offers ample flexibili-
ty in crisis time.  This flexibility is
unlikely to reassure markets. It is
important, therefore, to have credi-
ble enforcement mechanisms to
ensure that the budgetary boost
will be accompanied by sustain-
ability-enhancing measures.  
The remainder of this policy brief
spells out our argument in more
detail. The next section provides a
brief overview of the budgetary sit-
uation. In the third section we
discuss our budgetary stimulus
proposal. The fourth section is
devoted to the strengthening of
the budgetary framework. We
conclude in the fifth section with
concrete recommendations for the
Action Plan due to be presented by
the European Commission on 26b
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3European
Commission, 2005,
‘New and updated
budgetary sensitivities
for the EU budgetary
surveillance’, DG ECFIN,
30 September 2005,
Brussels.
4Luc Leaven and
Fabian Valencia, 2008,
‘Systemic Banking
Crises: A New
Database’, IMF Working
Paper Nr. 08/224.
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Figure 4: Projected budgetary deficits for euro-area countries,
2007-2010 (Bruegel scenario)
Source: Bruegel calculations.
Table 1
Growth assumptions for the euro area (in percent)
2007 2008 2009 2010
European Commission forecast 10/2008 2.7 1.2 0.1 0.9
IMF forecast 11/2008 2.6 1.2 -0.5 n/a
Bruegel scenario 1.2 -0.9 0.4
Source: European Commission, IMF, Bruegel calculations.
November and scheduled to be
tabled at the European Council of
11-12 December.  
BUDGETARY DEFICITS IN THE
AFTERMATH OF THE FINANCIAL
CRISIS
We first need to establish that the
link made in the introduction
between a budgetary stimulus in
the present financial crisis and a
strengthened commitment to
budgetary sustainability is rele-
vant in practice. To this end, we
develop a very simple scenario for
the coming years, focusing on the
euro area for the sake of presenta-
tional simplicity.
We start from the recent autumn
2008 economic and budgetary
forecast by the European
Commission, which puts the
growth prospects for the EU at 0.2
percent of GDP in 2009 and 1.1
percent in 2010 (0.1 percent and
0.9 percent respectively for the
euro area). This is projected to lead
to a deterioration of the budgetary
balance from -0.9 percent of GDP
on average in 2007 to -2.6 percent
in 2010 for the EU and from -0.6
percent to -2.0 percent in the euro
area. The 2009 deficit would
exceed the three percent threshold
in Ireland and France, and would
come close to it in Spain, Italy,
Portugal and Malta.  
In spite of a sharp downward revi-
sion compared with the spring
2008 forecast, this outlook is still
optimistic. The Commission notes
that risks to the growth forecast
are ‘firmly tilted to the downside’
and that ‘public finance projec-
tions are subject to significant
downside risk’ because of macro-
economic perspectives, the poten-
tial impact of changes in the com-
position of growth and the cost of
measures taken to support the
financial sector. Indeed, the recent
IMF projections are markedly dark-
er: what is predicted for the euro
area is an outright recession (-0.5
percent) in 2009. Yet the IMF also
notes that ‘financial conditions
continue to present significant
downside risks’. 
In our scenario we therefore start
from the Commission forecast and
assess the budgetary impact of a
downward adjustment of growth
by one percentage point for 2009
and 0.5 percentage points for
2010 (Table 1).
Figure 4 presents the conse-
quences of our scenario for public
finances. For assessing the conse-
quences, we assume a 0.1 expen-
ditures-to-output gap elasticity
and a unitary revenues-to-GDP
elasticity. These parameter values
are consistent with estimates
used by the European Commission
for the evaluation of the so-called
minimum benchmarks
3. They are
likely to err on the cautious side,
as during abrupt reversals the
income elasticity of government
receipts often exceeds average
values. This scenario does not
include any cost estimates for the
bank rescue packages beyond
those included in the Commission
forecast. Their costs are chronical-
ly difficult to estimate.
Historically, some government
rescue packages have led to major
budgetary losses while others
have even ended up producing a
minor surplus
4. Also, the deficit
scenario in Figure 4 does not
include any budgetary stimulusA EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME
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5Sachverständigenrat
zur Begutachtung der
gesamtwirtschaftlichen
Entwicklung, 2008, ‘Die
Finanzkrise meistern –
Wachstumskräfte
stärken’, Jahresbericht
2008/2009,
Statistisches
Bundesamt,
Wiesbaden.
6The minimum
standard and reduced
VAT rates in the EU (15
percent and 5 percent
respectively) would
have to be lowered
accordingly to allow for
a VAT cut in all
countries.
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Figure 5: Output gap in % for selected euro-area countries, 1990-2009
Source: OECD and own estimate based on growth assumption in Figure 4.
beyond the automatic stabilisers
that we have estimated with rev-
enue and expenditure elasticities
relative to the output gap. 
Even without such additional
factors, it is clear that a substan-
tial number of countries in the
euro area – Ireland, but also
France, Italy, Greece and Portugal
– are likely to exceed the three
percent deficit limit in 2009 and
even more in 2010.
Based on these findings, we
conclude that the link made
between the financial crisis, a pos-
sible budgetary stimulus and a
strengthened commitment to
budgetary sustainability is indeed
relevant in practice.
WHAT BUDGETARY STIMULUS? 
The condition of the European
economy prevailing in this crisis
corresponds almost exactly to the
textbook case for a budgetary
stimulus. It can be characterised
as a sudden and generalised dash
for liquidity combined with an
across-the-board heightening of
the aversion to debt. This situation
dampens the effectiveness of
monetary policy since financial as
well as non-financial agents tend
to hoard liquidity despite the
opportunity cost of holding cash
balances. The fear of illiquidity has
become overwhelming. And the
general aversion to debt is leading
to deleveraging, which implies a
drop in demand for goods as
spending on consumption or
investment takes second place to
paying down debt. In such condi-
tions where the propensity of
private agents to spend experi-
ences a sudden and dramatic
drop, budgetary policy must step
European scheme sets out to be,
especially if it goes beyond one
percent of GDP. This is a key reason
why we suggest that Europe
undertakes a coordinated one
percent budgetary boost. 
The budgetary stimulus to support
the real economy needs to be
timely and substantial to be effec-
tive. In the current crisis Europe
should therefore look for ways to
deliver the budgetary boost with-
out delay. Measures that require
thorough preparation, such as
coordinated increases in R&D or
infrastructure spending are thus
generally unsuitable unless they
have already been fully prepared.
Admittedly, such projects would
have the advantage of favourable
supply-side effects but would
typically only be effective in 2010,
whereas it is crucial to deliver the
budgetary impulse in the course of
the critical year 2009. 
This is why we advocate that a
substantial portion of the
budgetary boost be delivered
through a coordinated cut in VAT
rates
6. There are several shortcom-
ings to the use of VAT. It is not
in to boost aggregate demand.
Keynesian policy is needed and it
can be effective. 
The appropriate magnitude of the
budgetary boost depends on the
depth of the recession, which can
be approximated by the projected
output gap shown in Figure 5 and
the existing budgetary situation
discussed in the previous section
(Figure 4). While these figures
suggest that countries in the EU
are in different situations, all will
find themselves in negative out-
put-gap territory. 
How large should a uniform stimu-
lus be? For Germany, the largest
EU economy, the German Council
of Economic Experts
5 has just rec-
ommended a budgetary boost of
between 0.5 and one percent of
GDP for 2009. The output gap is
projected to be substantially larger
in other countries. But many of
these countries may have less
budgetary room for manoeuvre
than Germany because of higher
structural deficits. Therefore,
reaching a European consensus
rapidly is likely to prove more diffi-
cult the more ambitious theA EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME
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BOX 1: CORRECTION OF EXCESSIVE DEFICITS UNDER THE STABILITY AND GROWTH PACT (SGP)
The Stability and Growth Pact (SGP), provided for in Article 104 of the Nice Treaty, was adopted by the euro
area in 1997 in order to safeguard budgetary sustainability for the common currency. The Pact prescribes a
ceiling for annual budget deficits of three percent of GDP and sets out procedures for enforcing corrective
action in case this ceiling is breached, with the ultimate sanction of hefty fines for non-compliance. 
During the 2003 economic downturn both France and Germany fought to introduce more budgetary flexibility
into the Pact and to inject economic judgement into mechanical rules. They were ultimately successful and the
SGP was reformed in 2005. 
According to the reformed SGP any breach of the three percent deficit threshold leads to the opening of an
excessive deficit procedure (EDP), unless the excess over the reference value is exceptional, temporary and
close to the threshold value (Article 104.2 (b) and 104.3 of the Treaty). However, this clause providing for
exceptional circumstances offers relatively little budgetary flexibility since it only applies when the deficit is
close to the three percent limit. The real flexibility in the SGP instead lies in the long time lag before full applica-
tion of the EDP. This procedure states that the breach of the three percent threshold is only established the
year after the breach has occurred, once reliable data is available. A deadline for correction is then usually set
for the following year, ie the second year after the breach. Furthermore, the ‘code of conduct on the SGP’ per-
mits the deadline for corrective action to be ‘as a rule’ postponed to the third year after the breach in case of
exceptional circumstances. Hence, countries with large budget overruns in the current crisis might, in effect,
face no substantive constraint under the SGP until the year 2012, or even later. 
targeted, reductions in VAT rates
are less easily reversible than for
other measures and, depending on
the degree of competition on prod-
uct markets, part of the tax rebate
may not be passed on to
consumers. 
But there is a significant premium
in a coordinated and transparent
move. Also, a temporary VAT cut
provides a substantial incentive to
bring spending forward given the
subsequent return to the previous,
higher VAT rates. By the same
token, care needs to be taken to
minimise the delay between the
announcement of the VAT cut and
the cut itself, because during that
period there would be an obvious
incentive to postpone spending. 
If there is a significant price pass-
through, there may be concern
that headline inflation might
decrease further, bringing it close
to deflation. However,  since the
prospect of a price increase, which
would come with the VAT increase
when the measure is phased out,
would create inflationary expecta-
tions, we believe that concern
about deflationary risk should not
be exaggerated.
The proposed VAT cuts should be
complemented by other measures
tailored to specific national cir-
cumstances in order to deliver the
full budgetary boost of one
percent of GDP. The detail of these
additional measures need not be
coordinated at European level but
there should be agreement on the
desired orientation. Suitable meas-
ures include relief to segments of
the population likely to be most
affected by the crisis, especially
the working poor, and strength-
ened incentives to improve energy
efficiency. While implementation
at member-state level would differ,
there could be EU-wide agreement
on the proportion of the budgetary
packages that should be devoted
to these two additional goals. In
any event, there should be agree-
ment that the full budgetary
equivalent of these measures be
phased out in 2010. 
STRENGTHENING BUDGETARY
SUSTAINABILITY
In this section we explore the
weaknesses of the SGP in light of
the current crisis and propose how
to embed the budgetary boost in
an agreement to strengthen
budgetary sustainability.
The crisis and our proposal for a
short-term budgetary stimulus are
likely to trigger the launch by the
Commission of an excessive
deficit procedure (EDP) against a
significant number of EU member
states (see box). However, the EDP
is unlikely to bite until at least
2012. The prospect of such a long
time lag before corrective action
must be taken may not provide
markets with adequate reassur-
ance of budgetary sustainability.
We therefore propose that the rele-
vant provisions of the SGP shouldA EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME
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7 Countries wanting to
do more could intro-
duce budgetary rules
domestically such as
the “Schuldenbremse”
under consideration in
Germany.
8Benoît Coeuré and
Jean Pisani-Ferry,
2005, ‘Fiscal Policy in
Emu: Towards a
Sustainability and
Growth Pact?’, Oxford
Review of Economic
Policy, Vol 21 Issue 4,
598-617.
9See Daniel Cohen and
Richard Portes, 2004,
‘Towards a Lender of
First Resort’, CEPR
Discussion Paper
No.4615, for a similar
proposal for the
developing world.
be complemented by an ad-hoc EU
agreement designed to ensure
that the proposed exceptional
budgetary stimulus does not mark
a departure from budgetary
sustainability
7. This ad-hoc agree-
ment would not amend or replace
the SGP but complement it.
In concrete terms, we suggest the
following: 
1 Compensation of budgetary
overruns with countervailing
reforms to enhance budgetary
sustainability
Countries expected to exceed the
three percent deficit limit with the
proposed budgetary stimulus in
2009 would commit to table
immediate reforms to improve
budgetary sustainability, offset-
ting the short-term overrun. Such
reforms would have to be submit-
ted to the European Commission
for evaluation and would be
assessed in light of the projected
deficit overrun.
Reforms may include, for example,
a decision to cut specified public
spending items and benefit enti-
tlements in the future or to
increase specified taxes and
social security contributions.
However there is no commonly
agreed metric to evaluate any
savings generated by such
reforms. We thus propose to
entrust the Commission with the
task of proposing and
implementing a methodology for
evaluating the budgetary
equivalent of the reforms.
Conceptually, the method should
rely on an evaluation of the future
effects of reforms and a standard-
ised computation of the present
value of future budgetary savings. 
Measures introduced to improve
the medium-term sustainability of
public finances could imply a
reduction of the implicit, rather
than the explicit public debt. The
financial debt of a country in the
form of government bonds makes
up only a fraction of total
government liabilities. Commit-
ments to pay out future benefits,
such as pensions, over and above
future contributions, are part of an
implicit debt and are not included
in the Maastricht Treaty definition
of government debt. 
However, implicit and explicit debt
should not be treated in the same
way, first because the computa-
tion of a present value relies on
technical assumptions, and more
importantly because the implicit
debt can often be reduced by sim-
ple changes in legislation (such as
pension reforms). One euro of
explicit debt must therefore be
considered to be more serious
from the perspective of budgetary
sustainability than one euro of
implicit debt
8. A workable approach
could thus be, for example, to
apply a 50 percent haircut when
counting reform-related reduc-
tions in the stock of implicit debt.
With such an approach the stimu-
lus would increase the deficit in
the short run but it would at least
preserve sustainability in the
medium run.  
2 Accelerated corrective action in
the aftermath of the budgetary
stimulus
In our proposed package, the stim-
ulus would come first and the
reforms would follow, because the
urgency of the situation calls for
rapid budgetary action. But in order
to enhance the credibility of their
commitment to compensate the
stimulus by sustainability-enhanc-
ing reforms, member states would
agree upfront to dispense with the
time lag of the SGP’s excessive
deficit procedure. Normally, correc-
tive action would be required only
in 2012 or later in case of a sub-
stantial budgetary overrun above
the three percent ceiling. But,
under the proposed agreement,
failure to comply with the required
reforms to improve sustainability
would lead to corrective action as
early as   2010, thus significantly
accelerating application of the SGP
procedure without replacing it.
3 Low-interest borrowing
commitment
As a back-stop to ensure that situ-
ations which are sustainable on
paper are not viewed as unsus-
tainable by markets, member
states should commit not to bor-
row at abnormally high interest
rates. Specifically, we propose that
all euro-area countries commit not
to borrow at an interest rate of
more than 200 basis points above
the lowest government bond yield
within the euro area
9.
As Figure 3 shows, the interest dif-
ferentials for government bonds
within the euro area have in fact
increased substantially during the
present crisis. If the proposed limit
of 200 basis points is reached, we
propose that this should trigger an
emergency procedure where the
member state in question would
be allowed only to roll over existing
debt until its budget and any bor-
rowing plans have been approved
by the EU Council. This temporary
strengthening of budgetary sur-
veillance is designed to pre-emptb
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unsustainable positions and, on
balance, we consider that markets
would be reassured by such a
backstop process.
We propose that the European
Council in December 2008 adopt
these ad-hoc agreements to
ensure that the proposed coordi-
nated budgetary boost is embed-
ded in a framework of strength-
ened budgetary sustainability. The
elements of this agreement could
then be evaluated by 2011 with a
view formally to incorporating
them into the SGP once they have
passed the test of the current
crisis. 
A EUROPEAN RECOVERY PROGRAMME
AN ACTION PLAN FOR THE EUROPEAN COUNCIL
The final question is how the ambitious package proposed in this paper could realistically be implemented
by January 2009. For this, the proposed budgetary boost and the strengthened budgetary framework
would need to be included in the Action Plan for the current crisis due to be presented by the European
Commission on 26 November. Subsequently, the main parts of the package would need to be agreed by the
European Council at its meeting on 11-12 December. 
Specifically, such an agreement by the European Council should contain the following items:
• As many EU member states as possible
10and at the very least all countries of the euro area are to agree
to participate in a temporary European Recovery Programme (ERP) with national budgetary support
amounting to one percent of GDP. 
• Part of the ERP is implemented through a harmonised one percentage point cut in VAT rates across the
board, effective January 2009, to be reversed in all participating countries in the course of 2010. The
remainder of the ERP is to be implemented by national measures selected from a commonly agreed menu
which includes targeted relief especially to the working poor, and incentives to improve energy and CO2
efficiency. 
• The measures introduced within the framework of the ERP are to be phased out or financed by equivalent
receipts in the course of 2010. In particular, incentives to improve energy and CO2 efficiency introduced
as part of this package may be made permanent if budgetary improvements of equal value are enacted.  
• All countries whose deficit would exceed three percent in 2009 after the ERP is implemented are to under-
take to submit by 30 March 2009 the reforms they intend to implement to improve budgetary
sustainability and compensate the overrun above the three percent threshold. The Commission certifies
the budgetary equivalent of the reforms within two months.
• If by 1 September 2009 a member state whose budgetary deficit exceeds three percent of GDP has imple-
mented the budgetary stimulus but failed to enact commensurate flanking reforms, it is subject to an
accelerated excessive deficit procedure and the deadline for the adoption of corrective measures is
brought forward to 2010. 
• All participating euro-area countries commit not to borrow at interest rates higher than 200 basis points
above the lowest government bond yield in the euro area, even during a crisis. They agree to submit to
special budgetary oversight in the event of the yield on their debt breaching this threshold. 
• The ad-hoc measures introduced to strengthen budgetary sustainability as part of the ERP are to be eval-
uated by 2011 with a view to their formal incorporation into the SGP.
10Realistically, this
would have to exclude
countries currently
subject to an IMF
programme, such as
Hungary.
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